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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LA W: Memphis Community
School District v. Stachura
In Memphis Community School District v. Stachura,' the United States
Supreme Court held that the abstract "value" of the constitutional rights in-
fringed is an impermissible element of section 1983 damages. The Court
thereby reaffirmed that section 1983 damages are designed only to compen-
sate injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.
Stachura involved a seventh-grade life science teacher who was suspended
as a result of parental complaints about his use of allegedly sexually explicit
photographs and films as teaching aids. Before his reinstatement, the teacher
brought suit against the school district, the Board of Education, and several
individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 He sought compensatory and punitive
damages for deprivation of liberty and property rights without due process
and for the violation of his first amendment right to academic freedom. The
jury award was based on instructions authorizing two types of compensatory
damages, one associated with the actual injury and the other being linked to
the "importance" of the constitutional rights violated.
Carey v. Piphus,3 the Court's first decision on types of damages for con-
stitutional violations, held that no compensatory damages may be awarded
absent actual injury. Because Carey dealt with a procedural due process
deprivation, a conflict among the circuits has arisen as to whether the holding
extends to substantive violations.4 In Stachura, the Court declared that the
purpose of section 1983 damages is to provide compensation for injuries,
regardless of the category of the constitutional basis for liability.
5
Although labeled "compensatory," the damages authorized by the
challenged instruction were necessarily noncompensatory because they
related to the jury's perception of the value of constitutional rights in the
abstract. 6 The Court reasoned that to allow such an instruction would "inject
1. 106 S. Ct. 2537 (1986).
2. Section 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
4. See Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 106 S. Ct. 2537, 2541 n.5 (1986).
5. Id. at 2544.
6. See id.
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caprice into the determinations of damages in § 1983 cases," leaving juries at
liberty to make arbitrary awards with no evidentiary basis.
7
Drawing a distinction between damages for the inherent value of a right
and damages for a "non-monetary harm that cannot easily be quantified,",
the Court declined to characterize the former as "presumed damages. '"
Presumed damages, a substitute for ordinary compensatory damages, are
only appropriate when the plaintiff would not otherwise be able to recover
due to difficulty in establishing injury.'0 In the instant case, there was ample
proof from which the jury could have found actual harm to the plaintiff."
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,12 a federal constitutional tort
action analogous to the state cause of action provided for in section 1983 was
created. However, since Stachura and Carey involve statutory interpretation,
they are not binding in a judicially created Bivens action." Yet, courts us-
ually look to s;ection 1983 case law for guidance in determining damages in
Bivens actions; therefore, Stachura contributes indirectly to the consistency
of the full body of constitutional tort remedial law.'
4
FEDERAL COURTS: No Federal Question Over a State-created
Claim That Incorporates a Federal Standard
Federal district courts have jurisdiction over claims arising under the Con-
stitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.' A case may arise under
federal law "where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily
turned on some construction of federal law." ' 2 In Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,3 the Supreme Court held that no federal
question jurisdiction existed where plaintiffs' claim was created under a state
law that incorporated a federal standard, the violation of which did not give
rise to a private cause of action.
Plaintiffs sued in state court on common law theories of negligence, breach
of warranty, strict liability, fraud, and gross negligence.4 One of the counts
alleged that defendant had violated the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics
Act (FDCA)' and that this constituted a rebuttable presumption of
7. Id. at 2545.
8. Id. at n.14.
9. Id. at 2545.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2541.
12. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
13. Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CALIF. L. REV.
1242, 1267 n.210 (1979).
14. Id. at 1244 n.12.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1980).
2. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983).
3. 106 S. Ct. 3229 (1986).
4. Id. at 3231.




negligence. 6 Defendant removed the case to federal court alleging that the ac-
tion was founded on a claim arising under the laws of the United States.
Plaintiffs' motion to remand on the ground that the federal court lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction was denied, and the court then granted defendant's
motion to dismiss due to forum non conveniens.7 The Sixth Circuit reversed,
stating that "[flederal question jurisdiction would ... exist only if plaintiffs'
right to relief depended necessarily on a substantial question of federal
law."' Because the jury could find for plaintiff without finding a violation of
the FDCA, the court reasoned that the case did not depend on the issue of
federal law.9
The Supreme Court affirmed. Crucial to the holding was the undisputed
conclusion of the court of appeals that there is no private federal cause of ac-
tion for FDCA violations.' 0 The Court said that Congress did not intend to
establish a private federal remedy when it enacted the statute." The Court
reasoned that if Congress did not intend to create a federal cause of action
for violations of the FDCA, it would undermine such intent to allow federal
question jurisdiction of a state law claim that incorporated a violation of the
statute as a standard of liability.'"
The holding in Merrell Dow seems to be contrary to a literal interpretation
of Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, which held
that federal question jurisdiction would exist if "it appears that some
substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of
the well-pleaded state claims.' '1 3 Violation of the FDCA is a question of
federal law. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that such a violation established a
presumption of negligence. Therefore, if they could show a violation, plain-
tiffs would be entitled to recover. The Court held, instead, that the congres-
sional intent not to create a private federal remedy for violations of the
FDCA amounted to a congressional determination that the presence of such
a violation in a state-created claim is insufficient to confer federal question
jurisdiction."'
The holding may be an attempt to reconcile earlier cases concerning this
type of federal question jurisdiction." Merrell Dow seems to hold that the
6. 106 S. Ct. at 3231.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 3231-32.
9. Id. at 3232.
10. Id. at 3234.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 3235.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 3236.
15. Compare Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921) (Court found
federal question jurisdiction where the federal issue was the constitutionality of an important
federal statute) with Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R., 291 U.S. 205 (1934) (no federal ques-
tion jurisdiction of a state-created tort recovery which incorporated a federal standard as an ele-
ment of recovery).
19871
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word "substantial" refers to the nature of the federal issue, not its place in
plaintiffs' claim. Thus a question of statutory interpretation of an issue for
which Congress has determined there should be no private federal remedy is
insufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction. On the other hand, the
presence of a constitutional issue, or a federal statutory issue not singled out
by Congress as inappropriate for the federal courts, could confer federal
question jurisdiction if plaintiff's right to recover necessarily depends on it.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Time to File Pleadings
Section 2005E of the Oklahoma Pleading Code' provides that pleadings
and other papers that must be filed with the court shall be filed with the clerk
of the court, except that the judge may permit them to be filed with him.
This provision is the same as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(e). The
federal courts have held that the federal rule requires the actual receipt of the
pleading within the prescribed time. "If mailed, the filing is accomplished
only when actually received by the clerk or when placed in the clerk's post of-
fice box. Filings reaching the clerk's office after a deadline are untimely,
even if mailed before the deadline. '" However, there is no deadline for filing
papers subsequent to the petition that must be served upon a party. "All
papers after the petition required to be served upon a party shall be filed with
the court either before service or within a reasonable time thereafter."
3
1. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2005E (Supp. 1986).
2. Torras Herreria y Construcciones, S.A. v. M/V Timur Star, 803 F.2d 215, 216 (6th Cir.
1986) (citation omitted).
3. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2005D (Supp. 1986). See section 2005A in regard to what papers must
be served upon parties to the action.
[Vol. 40
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss1/10
